The world has stood by in equal measure dismay and desperation as the Trump administration has overturned decades of American foreign policy, most notably in its handling of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The vow to bring the war to an end “within 24 hours” was always going to be a tall order, but reality has been even more complicated, with initial steps that have left allies stunned and rivals regrouping.
When President Trump began his second term in office, he did not hesitate to call Russian President Vladimir Putin, having a phone call that was, by his own description, effusive. This call, incidentally, preceded a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, indicating a pronounced shift in priority. As Daniel Fried stated, Hegseth’s follow-up comments at NATO headquarters established that restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 border was now “unrealistic,” and that Ukraine’s membership in NATO was on the table in any negotiated deal. The message to Europe was clear: the U.S. would not “put boots on the ground” in Ukraine, and it was time European nations stepped up.
This sudden about-face stunned European capitals. The European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, denounced what she referred to as “appeasement” and was specifically outraged by Europe and Ukraine’s exclusion from talks with Russia. As James Batchik wrote, Brussels was left wondering whether the United States was still a friend. France, where President Emmanuel Macron had vindicated its warnings of European “strategic autonomy,” now had the daunting challenge of making words into deeds. Germany, in the middle of an election campaign, was strategically rudderless, with its military neither equipped for instant deployment nor inclined to discuss the tough decisions waiting ahead.
And the economic strategy of the Trump administration created another complication. The April minerals agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine was hailed as a means of attaching American interests to the recovery, and possibly the security, of Ukraine. But as SIPRI analysts noted, the agreement pre-empts Ukrainian domestic law, contains no official security guarantees, and is underpinned by spectacularly over-optimistic assumptions as to the worth of Ukraine’s mineral wealth. Much of the most valuable land is in Russian hands, and the agreement could trap Ukraine in a cycle of extractivism that could undermine its long-term stability.
At war, the conflict has bogged down into a bloody stalemate. Following three years of massive war, Russia occupies roughly 18% of Ukraine’s territory, with little more than incremental gains in 2024. Ukrainian troops are still severely reliant on Western arms and ammunition, but the Trump administration has not requested new congressional appropriations for military assistance, forcing Europe to pick up the slack. Brookings experts say Europe’s defense industrial base is not yet sufficient to supply Ukraine by itself.
The negotiating strategy of the Trump administration has been characterized by what to many appears as rookie errors—giving away significant points to Moscow before negotiations even start, antagonizing European allies, and causing Kyiv to worry about a U.S.-Russian fait accompli. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s words at NATO, repeated by Vice President JD Vance, left no doubt that the U.S. demands that Europe supply the peacekeeping or security troops to Ukraine without any U.S. military presence. This has pushed European leaders to weigh options previously unimaginable: sending their own soldiers to Ukraine, appropriating Russian frozen funds, and significantly raising defense budgets.
NATO itself has attempted to evolve. The partnership has intensified its concrete support to Ukraine, aligning training, equipment, and funding under new organizations such as the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC). NATO reports that Allies have disbursed more than EUR 50 billion in security assistance in 2024, with Europe and Canada now covering almost 60% of the bill. But the cohesion of the alliance is strained, with some member states resistant to sending troops and others, such as the Baltic states and Poland, advocating greater offensive action.
Russia, in the meantime, has taken a high toll in casualties and equipment, but Vladimir Putin is still wedded to his maximalist objectives. He has been reluctant to negotiate at all unless on his own terms, insisting on Russian annexations being recognized and Ukraine being demilitarized. The expectation of the Trump administration that it would be able to coax Russia away from China and employ Moscow as a counterbalance in Asia has remained an illusion so far. As CFR analysts noted, China and Russia have deepened their economic and strategic ties further, and China continues to be the paramount power in most of Asia.
The wider implications for the world are deep. The U.S. withdrawal from its historical leadership role has made partners wonder whether American security commitments can be trusted. The burden-shifting, transactional strategy has challenged Europe to come to terms with its own weakness and begin thinking about a future in which it will be responsible for defending itself. Meanwhile, the American emphasis on great power rivalry with China, combined with the willingness to deal with autocrats, has created new uncertainties within the international order.
As the dust settles, one thing is certain: the Trump administration’s policy towards Ukraine has not only altered the trajectory of one war—it is transforming the European security architecture and global balance of power. Whether this new world order will be more stable or more threatening is as yet unclear, but the age of American-led security in Europe is, for the moment, suspended.
