Following the brutal defeat at Kasserine Pass, the US II Corps stood at a crossroads in North Africa. The defeat had revealed disconcerting deficiencies in leadership, coordination, and fighting power. When General Harold Alexander of the 18th Army Group visited II Corps in February 1943, he was not impressed. His report presented a dismal picture of Major General Lloyd Fredendall’s command. But in the midst of criticism, there was optimism: troop morale was still high, and Major General Orlando Ward’s 1st Armored Division was beginning to look promising.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, had come to the end of his patience with Fredendall. He made the bold move to replace him with Major General George S. Patton, Jr. as commander of II Corps. To maintain the balance and keep an eye on Patton’s notoriously hot temper, Eisenhower appointed Major General Omar Bradley as Patton’s deputy. Patton accepted the arrangement philosophically and soon developed a solid working rapport with Bradley, making him a trusted right-hand man.
Patton didn’t waste any time. He commanded about 88,000 soldiers, comprising the 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st Ranger Battalion, and some scattered tank destroyer battalions. Eisenhower and Alexander also initiated a number of steps to solidify the corps. Special British liaison officers, experienced in the Eighth Army, were used to advise and coordinate, American 37mm anti-tank guns, which were obsolete, were replaced with the more robust British 6-pounders, and veteran troops and officers were moved in to support the numbers.
Patton’s objective was simple: drive Axis forces out of Gafsa and press onward east to El Guettar, Sened Station, and Maknassy. The idea was not a race to the sea but a series of solid victories to restore morale to the troops and Allied commanders alike. II Corps also had the objective of drawing enemy forces away from Field Marshal Montgomery’s Eighth Army moving north toward Tunis on the Mareth Line.
The offensive began with Ward’s 1st Armored Division advancing on Gafsa, to discover that the foe had retreated before them. Patton pushed his troops forward, but the desert soon became a mudbath following heavy rainfall, grounding tanks and hampering movement. Colonel William Darby’s 1st Ranger Battalion took El Guettar with little resistance, although advancing towards Sened was more difficult. When American forces eventually arrived in Sened, artillery fire compelled the last defenders to surrender or retreat.
Patton’s aggressive style occasionally collided with the more conservative approach anticipated by his superiors. Although initially instructed to make only a demonstration toward Maknassy, Patton advocated a full-scale attack, taking commanding heights and directing enemy airfield attacks.
Ward’s armored troops regularly discovered the foe had melted away, forcing Americans to struggle through mud and disorganization. Ward, who prided himself on careful planning, favored measured, methodical assaults over expensive daylight attacks by weary troops—an option that often irritated Patton.
The real challenge arrived when the Germans counterattacked. Early on March 23, 1943, the Axis’s sole mobile reserve in the region, the 10th Panzer Division, hit them hard. Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen’s 1st Infantry Division saw the advance before dawn in the valley. The Germans gained some initial success but were halted at the Keddab wadi, where a field of American mines wiped out eight tanks. Later, the artillery and tank destroyers destroyed another thirty vehicles. The Germans reorganized and attempted again in the evening but were again stopped by persistent American fire.
The battle around El Guettar was fierce but inconclusive. Both sides took losses, and neither was able to launch a large-scale offensive in the subsequent days. II Corps, however, improved visibly. In contrast to the fragmented, small-unit tactics of February, the corps had now become an effective unit, taking the initiative and reacting quickly to enemy action.
Patton’s command was not without controversy. His impatience with Ward’s slow pace resulted in Ward’s eventual dismissal. Patton and the other commanders desired a more rapid advance to the coast, but Alexander’s steady, incremental strategy paid dividends. Gradually, II Corps grew into an increasingly influential factor in the campaign, allowing the Allies to sustain momentum for the rest of the North African struggle.
North Africa was a tough proving ground for the new American army. The Tunisian lessons—through experience, experiment, and adaptation—shaped the soldiers who would fight later across Europe. Patton’s transformation of II Corps was instrumental, making it a more effective, assertive, and battle-hardened force. By the end of the campaign, the Allies had caused almost 200,000 casualties among Axis troops and taken about 275,000 prisoners, dealing a crushing blow and paving the way for future success in the Mediterranean theater.
